See more. Charles Travis. Thought's Footing is an enquiry into the relationship between the ways things are and the way we think and talk about them. It is also a study of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Charles Travis develops his account of certain key themes into a unified view of the work as a whole.
His methodological starting-point is to see Wittgenstein's work as a response to Frege's. The central question is: how does thought get its footing? How can the thought that things are a certain way be connected to things being that way? Wittgenstein departs from Frege in holding that there are indefinitely many ways of filling out giving content to the notion of truth.. The truth of a thought or utterance is connected with the consequences of thinking or saying it. That is the point of Wittgenstein's introduction of the notion of a language game.
The second key theme is this: a representation of things as being a certain way cannot take the right form for truth-bearing without a background of agreement in judgements: its form must belong to thinkers of a given kind. The third key theme is that the proprietary perceptions of a given sort of thinker as to what would be a case of judging when there is a particular way for things to be is not subject to criticism from outside it.
Along the way Travis gives his own distinctive take on such topics as the problem of singular thought, the notion of a proposition, rule-following, sense and nonsense, the possibility of private language, and the representational content of experience. The result is an original and stimulating demonstration of the continuing value of Wittgenstein's work for central debates in philosophy today.
Book 2. This book is a collection of 12 essays that focus not only on Nietzsche's critique of the metaphysical assumptions of language, but also on his effort to use language in a different way, i. It is from this viewpoint that the book considers such themes as consciousness, the self, metaphor, instinct, affectivity, style, morality, truth, and knowledge. The two books complement each other. The First-Person Point of View. Wolfgang Carl. The interest in a better understanding of what is constitutive for being a person is a concern philosophy shares with some of the sciences.
The views currently discussed in evolutionary biology and in the neurosciences are very much influenced by traditional philosophical views about the self and self-knowledge, while contemporary philosophical accounts are not considered at all. Such an account will be given by an analysis of three focal elements of the use of the first-person pronoun.
These elements have something to do with the faculty of taking a first-person point of view. The conceptual structure of this point of view is explained by comparing it with a second- and third-person point of view. There is an extensive discussion of various views about self-knowledge Davidson, Bilgrami, Burge , and a new conception of authoritative self-knowledge is established. The first-person point of view is a reflexive attitude which includes various attitudes to one's past and future. I have several misgivings with this proposal. First, the truth-sufficiency account seems under-motivated and problematic.
By way of motivation, Neta suggests 21 that it explains the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification henceforth IEM and related phenomena. But this is implausible, even before we see the details. As Evans and subsequent commentators have stressed, the class of judgments that display IEM outstrips the class of judgments that exploit PA an example is offered below , and so the proposed explanation is at best incomplete. As for the truth-sufficiency account itself, it only offers an account of PA to propositional attitudes if such attitudes can be presented to consciousness in such a way as to provide a reason or justification for the belief that one has those attitudes.
We have, at present at least, no promising model of how this might work Coliva In any case, Neta doesn't really offer any reason for thinking that the distribution of relevant abilities is as the standard picture of the reach of PA needs it to be, given his proposal.
He's well aware of this, and seems inclined not to worry, suggesting that we should be open to the possibility that further investigation may reveal the reach of PA to be rather more limited or more extensive than we typically assume But if we already have reservations about Neta's proposal, this is liable to seem unsatisfying.
Still, while I'm sceptical of Neta's own response, he raises a significant challenge. Many of us will want to hold that one can have PA to what one believes even if content externalism is true, but Neta worries that reconciling these in the manner developed further by Crispin Wright in his contribution to this volume, for example may undermine the obvious motivation for holding that one cannot have PA to one's knowings, rememberings, and seeings; that if we could, we could put that together with our knowledge -- presumably also available from the armchair -- of the factivity of knowing and remembering, and the object-involving nature of the relevant notion of seeing, in order to yield armchair knowledge of contingent facts about the external world.
The matter deserves more careful consideration than I can give it here. Sven Bernecker's contribution argues that the scope of PA is narrower than philosophers are prone to supposing. He makes a case that the representationalist theory of mind, familiar from the work of Fred Dretske and others, entails that while one can have armchair knowledge that one knows p rather than q , one cannot have armchair knowledge that one knows p rather than having no knowledge at all.watch
Self-Knowledge // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame
By the K-norm, my asserting some proposition q implies that I know q. By KK, my knowing q implies that I'm in a position to know that I know q. So it follows that my asserting q implies that I'm in a position to know that I know q. But all this is liable to impress as relying on a pun on 'implies'. It doesn't follow that in asserting p I represent myself as being in a position to know that I know p, since neither my audience nor I may have the slightest inkling that KK holds. In any case, Bernecker doesn't consider any rival explanations of the absurdity of epistemic Moorean assertions; in particular, he doesn't consider the better known, more economical, and less problematic explanation that dispenses with KK and just appeals to the K-norm see Williamson So I'm inclined to think that if the KK principle proves to be in tension with a well-motivated conclusion, we can surrender KK without much fallout.
According to contrastivism, 'S knows that p' expresses a three-place relation between a subject, a proposition p, and a contrast proposition q which can shift with shifts in context.
This allows Bernecker to distinguish the question of whether one can have armchair knowledge that one knows p rather than that one knows q from the question of whether one can have armchair knowledge that one knows p rather than that one lacks any knowledge whatsoever. Bernecker's central claim, then, is that representationalism entails that one can have the former but not the latter. But the significance of this conclusion was rather lost on me, given my uncertainties and concerns about the path by which Bernecker reaches it.
- 1. Self-Consciousness in the History of Philosophy;
- Blues, Metal, Jazz and Classical Influence.
- Moore's Paradox: A Critique of Representationalism.
Anthony Brueckner contributes a critical notice of Dorit Bar-On's excellent book, which offered the most sophisticated and detailed version of an expressivist account of the distinctive security of avowals yet produced, and Bar-On is given a chance to clarify her position and respond to Brueckner's worries. Traditional expressivism goes wrong, according to Bar-On, in failing to distinguish various notions of expression. Moreover, Bar-on also holds that one also a-expresses the belief that one is in a headache.
The 'neo' bit of the view allows Bar-On to escape the usual Frege-Geach-style worries with expressivism allows her to preserve semantic innocence , as she prefers to say , while the 'expressivism' bit enables her to explain the distinctive features of avowals -- that they're so strongly presumed to be true, aren't subjected to the usual epistemic assessment, and so on.
In this exchange, Brueckner lobs about eleven objections at neo-expressivism, and Bar-On plays defence. Each ends up with a rather mixed scorecard. In my opinion, Bar-On successfully sees off some of Brueckner's worries. For example, I think Bar-On is entirely correct to insist, contrary to Bruckner's suggestion , that a-expression is not at bottom a causal notion. And I think she makes a good case that some of Brueckner's objections turn on misunderstandings of her view.
Others, however, remain. Like Brueckner , I'm inclined to think that there's no insight that can be gleaned from Burge's discussion of 'self-verifying' judgments such as that expressed by 'I am thinking that water is wet' and generalized to avowals as a class. An example of a scientific realist is John Locke , who held the world only contains the primary qualities that feature in a corpuscularian scientific account of the world see corpuscular theory , and that other properties were entirely subjective , depending for their existence upon some perceiver who can observe the objects.
The modern philosopher of science Howard Sankey argues for a form of scientific realism which has commonsense realism as one of its foundations. Realism in physics refers to the fact that physical systems must have definite properties when measured or observed. Physics until the nineteenth century was implicitly and sometimes explicitly based on philosophical realism. There is no real reason for supposing that a particle has at every moment a definite, but unknown, position which may be revealed by a measurement of the right kind On the contrary, we get into a maze of contradiction as soon as we inject into quantum mechanics such concepts as carried over from the language and philosophy of our ancestors It would be more exact if we spoke of 'making measurements' of this, that, or the other type instead of saying that we measure this, that, or the other 'physical quantity'.
Some interpretations of quantum mechanics hold that a system lacks an actualized property until it is measured, which implies that quantum systems exhibit a non-local behavior. Bell's theorem proved that every quantum theory must either violate locality or counterfactual definiteness. This claim has given rise to a contentious debate of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Although locality and 'realism,' in the sense of counterfactual definiteness, are jointly false, it is possible to retain one of them.
The majority of working physicists discard counterfactual definiteness in favor of locality, since non-locality is held to be contrary to relativity. As quantum mechanics is applied to larger and larger objects, even a one-ton bar, proposed to detect gravity waves, must be analysed quantum mechanically, while in cosmology a wave function for the whole universe is written to study the Big Bang. By realism, he means the idea that objects have specific features and properties — that a ball is red, that a book contains the works of Shakespeare, or that an electron has a particular spin Instead, what we see may depend on how we look.
In the research paper The reality of virtual reality it is proposed that, "virtuality is itself a bona fide mode of reality, and that 'virtual reality' must be understood as 'things, agents and events that exist in cyberspace'. These proposals resolve the incoherences found in the ordinary uses of these terms From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Main article: Principle of locality. Knasas Thomas Reid Everett W. Hall P.