First, therefore, we must discuss All three of these philosophers, for different reasons, agreed that external things were indifferent; no one external condition wealth, poverty, health, sickness etc. Therefore, C. Second, he is not merely translating or expounding Stoic authorities but using them selectively and critically see Introduction, pp. However, only the wise man, who fully possesses every virtue, can perform a right action, one which, in itself, apart from its consequences, is perfect and complete Fin.
His 'complete' duty, as C. Common also to all animals is the impulse to unite for the purpose of procreation, and a certain care for those that are born. The great difference between man and beast, however, is this: the latter adapts itself only in responding to the senses, and only to something that is present and at hand, scarcely aware of the past or future. Man, however, is a sharer in reason; this enables him to perceive consequences, to comprehend the causes of things, their precursors and their antecedents, so to speak; to compare similarities and to link and combine future with present events; and by seeing with ease the whole course of life to prepare whatever is" necessary for living it.
It drives him! Therefore, whenever we are free from necessary business and other concerns we are eager to see or to hear or to learn, considering that the discovery of obscure or wonderful things is necessary for a blessed life. Consequently, we understand that what is true, simple and pure is most fitted to the nature of man.
- Cicero: On Duties (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought).
- Religious Education in a Global-Local World.
- Recovering Nineteenth-Century Women Interpreters of the Bible!
- Web Services on Rails!
- Customer Reviews.
- Your Cubase studio;
In addition to this desire for seeing the truth, there is a kind of impulse towards pre-eminence, so that a spirit that is well trained by nature will not be willing to obey for its own benefit someone whose advice, teaching and commands are not just and lawful. Greatness of spirit and a disdain for human things arise as a result. No other animal, therefore, perceives the beauty, the loveliness, and the congruence of the parts, of the things that sight perceives. Nature and reason transfer this by analogy from the eyes to the mind, thinking that beauty, constancy and order should be preserved, and much more so, in one's decisions and in one's deeds.
They are careful also to do nothing in an unseemly or effeminate way, in all their opinions and actions thinking and doing nothing licentiously. The honourableness that we seek is created from and accomplished by these things. Even if it is not accorded acclaim, it is still honourable, and, as we truly claim, even if no one praises it, it is by nature worthy of praise. Although these four are bound together and interwoven,2 certain kinds of duties have their origin in each individually. For example, in the part that we described as first, in which we placed wisdom and good sense,3 there lie the investigation and discovery of what is true, and that is the peculiar function of that virtue.
The two supplementary topics are treated at the end of Book 1 and Book 11 See Introduction, pp. In the next chapters C. See 1. See Wisdom and good sense, here treated together, are separated at 1. De Officiis Book 1 a man is extremely good at perceiving what is most true in each particular thing, and when he is able with great acuity and speed to see and to explain the reason, then he is rightly considered extremely sensible and wise.
Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws
Therefore, the thing that underlies this virtue, the matter as it were that it handles and treats, is truth. Again, order, constancy, moderation, and the qualities similar to these are associated with the group that requires not only mental activity, but also some action. For we shall conserve honourableness and seemliness if we apply some limit and order to the things with which we deal in our life.
The first of these, that consisting of the learning of truth, most closely relates to human nature. For all of us feel the pull that leads us to desire to learn and to know; w e ' think it a fine thing to excel in this, while considering it bad and dishonourable to stumble, to wander, to be ignorant, to be deceived.
In this category, which is both natural and honourable, one must avoid two faults: first, we should not take things that have not been ascertained for things that have, and rashly assent to them. Anyone who wants to avoid that fault as everyone indeed should will take time and care when he ponders any matter. It is, however, contrary to duty to be drawn by such a devotion away from practical achievements: all the praise that belongs to virtue lies in action.
On the other hand, there is often a break from it, and we are given many opportunities to return to our studies. Besides, the activity of the mind, which is never at rest, can maintain in us our pursuit of learning even without effort on our part. For reflective movements of the spirit occur in one of two ways: either when taking counsel about honourable matters, that pertain to living well and blessedly, or in the pursuit of knowledge and learning.
We have now discussed the first source of duty. There are two parts of this: justice, the most illustrious of the virtues, on account of which men are called 'good'; 1 and the beneficence connected with it, which may be called either kindness or liberality. Of justice, the first office is that no man should harm another unless he has been provoked by injustice; the next that one should treat common goods as common and private ones as one's own.
The result is that the land of Arpinum is said to belong to the Arpinates, and that of Tusculum to the Tusculani. Consequently, since what becomes each man's own comes from what had in nature been common, each man should hold on to whatever has fallen to him. If anyone else should seek any of it for himself, he will be violating the law of human fellowship. See also 1. The remark that men are called 'good' for being just reflects not only common moral notions Digest xix. These correspond respectively to the positive and negative forms of injustice at 1. Moreover, as the Stoics believe, everything produced on the earth is created for the use of mankind, and men are born for the sake of men, so that they may be able to assist one another.
Consequently, we ought in this to follow nature as our leader, to contribute to the common stock the things that benefit everyone together, and, by the exchange of dutiful services, by giving and receiving expertise and effort and means, to bind fast the fellowship of men with each other.
Therefore, though this will perhaps seem difficult to some, let us venture to imitate the Stoics, who hunt assiduously for the derivations of words, and let us trust that keeping faith fides is so called because what has been said is actually done fiat? Of injustice there are two types: men may inflict injury; or else, when it is being inflicted upon others, they may fail to deflect it, even though they could.
Anyone who makes an unjust attack on another, whether driven by anger or by some other agitation, seems to be laying hands, so to speak, upon a fellow. But also, the man who does not defend someone, or obstruct the injustice when hte can, is at fault just as if he had abandoned his parents or his friends or his country. In most cases, however, men set about committing injustice in order to secure something that they desire: where this fault is concerned avarice is extremely widespread. In men of greater spirit, however, the desire for wealth has as its goal influence and the opportunity to gratify others.
Marcus Crassus, for example, recently said that no one who wanted to be pre-eminent in the republic would have wealth enough if he could not feed an army on its yield. The result of such things is that desire for money has become unlimited. Such expansion of one's personal wealth as harms no one is not, of course, to be disparaged; but committing injustice must always be avoided.
That is why we find the observation of Ennius to be widely applicable: Letter ix a. Stoic interest in etymology was connected with the belief that language had its basis in nature, not convention. The derivation of words also had a great vogue in Rome of this period and figures prominently in what remains of Varro's On the Latin Language, which he was writing about this time and dedicated in part to C. In the description of positive injustice treated in we must supply the absence of provocation noted at Negative injustice is treated in The rash behaviour of Gaius Caesar has recently made that clear: he overturned all the laws of gods and men for the sake of the pre-eminence that he had imagined for himself in his mistaken fancy.
There is something troubling in this type of case, in that the desire for honour, command, power and glory usually exist in men of the greatest spirit and most brilliant intellectual talent. The first adumbration of what is to become the 'rule of procedure' at m. De Offiriis Book 1 injury was committed through some agitation of the spirit, which is generally brief and momentary, or purposefully and with forethought. For those things that happen because of some sudden impulse are less serious than those inflicted after reflection and preparation.
But I have now said enough about actually committing injustice. For some men do not wish to incur enmities, or toil, or expense; others are hindered by indifference, laziness, inactivity or some pursuits or business of their own, to the extent that they allow the people whom they ought to protect to be abandoned.
We must therefore watch out in case Plato's words about philosophers prove not to be sufficient. For he said that they are immersed in the investigation of the truth and that, disdaining the very things for which most men vigorously strive and even fight one another to the death, they count them as nothing.
Because of that he calls them just. They observe one type of justice, indeed, that they should harm no one else by inflicting injury, but they fall into another; for hindered by their devotion to learning, they abandon those whom they ought to protect. And so, he thinks that they should not even embark upon public life unless they are forced to do io. But though they are free from one type of injustice, they run into another: such men abandon the fellowship of life, because they contribute to it nothing of their devotion, nothing of their effort, nothing of their means.
Since we have set out the two types of injustice, and added the causes of each, and since we established previously what are the things that constitute justice, we shall now be able to judge with ease what is our duty on each occasion - that is, if we do not love ourselves too much. Terence's Chremes, however, thinks 'nothing that is human is another's affair';1 yet in fact we do tend to notice and feel our own good and bad fortune more than that of others, which we see as if a great distance intervenes; accordingly, we do not make the same judgements about them and about ourselves.
It is good advice therefore that prevents you from doing anything if you are unsure whether it is fair or unfair. For fairness shines out by itself, and hesitation signifies that one is contemplating injustice. For example, from time to time it becomes just to set aside such requirements as the returning of a deposit, or the carrying out of a promise, or other things that relate to truth and to keeping faith, and not to observe them. Such actions alter with the circumstances, and duty alters likewise, and is not invariable.
If Neptune in the myth had not done what he had promised to Theseus, Theseus would not have been deprived of his son Hippolytus. He made three wishes, as we read, and the third was this: he wished in his anger that Hippolytus should die. When it was granted he fell into the deepest grief. Therefore promises should not be kept if they are disadvantageous to those to whom you have made them. Nor, if they harm you more than they benefit the person whom you have promised, is it contrary to duty to prefer the greater good to the lesser.
For example, if you had made an appointment to appear for someone as advocate in the near future, and in the meantime your son had fallen seriously ill, it would not be contrary to your duty not to do as you had said. Rather, the person to whom you had made the promise would be failing in his duty if he complained that he had been abandoned. Again, who does not see that if someone is forced to make a promise through fear, or deceived into it by trickery, the promise ought not to stand?
For the question of keeping promises, see also III. De Officiis Book 1 promises in most cases by the praetor's code of justice, and sometimes by the laws. In consequence the saying 'the more Justice, the more injustice' has by now become a proverb well worn in conversation. Many wrongs of this type are committed even in public affairs; and example is that of the man who, during a truce of thirty days which had been agreed with the enemy, laid waste the fields by night, on the grounds that the truce had been established for days, but not for nights.
We should not approve the action even of our own countryman, if the story is true about Quintus Fabius Labeo or some other person - for I know of it only from hearsay. He was assigned by the senate to arbitrate about the boundary between the Nolani and the Neapolitani. When he arrived at the place he spoke with each group separately, urging it to do nothing out of covetousness or greed, and to be prepared to retreat rather than to advance.
When both of them did that, there was some land left in the middle. Therefore he set a limit to their boundaries exactly where they themselves had said; but he assigned the land that was left in the middle to the people of Rome. That was not arbitration, that was deception. Cleverness of such a king ought in every case to be avoided.
Moreover, certain duties must be observed even towards those at whose hands you may have received unjust treatment. There is a limit to revenge and to punishment. I am not even sure that it is not enough simply that the man who did the harm should repent of his injustice, so that he himself will do no such thing again, and others will be slower to act unjustly.
There are two types of conflict: the one proceeds by debate, the other by force. Since the former is the proper concern of a man, but the latter of beasts, one should only resort to the latter if one may not employ the former. Thus, our forefathers even received the Tusculani, the Aequi, the Volsci, the Sabini and the Hernici into citizenship.
On the other hand they utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia. I would prefer that they had not destroyed Corinth; but I believe that they had some specific purpose in doing so, in particular in view of its advantageous situation, to prevent the location itself from being some day an incitement to war. If I had been followed in this we would still have some republican government if perhaps not the very best ; whereas now we have none. From this we can grasp that no war is just unless it is waged after a formal demand for restoration, or unless it has been formally 1 On promises and deposits, cf.
Civil law in Rome comprised laws, those in the Twelve Tables or passed later, and ius praetorium, the formulae 'rules of procedure' set out by each successive city praetor an annual magistrate in his edict, through which important legal developments took place in the Late Republic cf. He first mentions peoples of Italy conquered by Rome and later admitted to Roman citizenship in the fourth and third centuries BC cf.
For C. De Officiis Book 1 announced and declared beforehand. Popilius then decided to dismiss one of the legions, and included in the dismissal the young Cato, who was serving in that legion. But when, out of love of fighting, he remained in the army, Cato wrote to Popilius saying that if he allowed him to stay in the army he should bind him by a fresh military oath, since he could not in justice fight the enemy when his former oath had become void.
Such was their extreme scrupulousness when making war. He warns him therefore to be careful not to enter battle. For, he says, it is not lawful for one who is not a soldier tofightwith the enemy. I notice that the grimness of the fact is lessened by the gentleness of the word. For hostis meant to our forefathers he whom we now call a stranger. The Twelve Tables show this: for example, 'a day appointed for trial with a hostis'; and again, 'right of ownership cannot be alienated in favour of a hostis'.
What greater courteousness could there be than to call him against whom you are waging war by so tender a name? Long usage, however, has made the name harsher; for the word has abandoned the stranger, and now makes its proper home with him who bears arms against you. For just as in civilian matters we may compete in one way with an enemy, in another with a rival for the latter contest is for honour and standing, the former for one's civic life or reputation , similarly the wars against the Celtiberi and the Cimbri were waged with enemies:2 the question was not who would rule, but who would exist.
With the Latins, Sabini, Samnites, Carthaginians and Pyrrhus, on the other hand, the dispute was over empire. The Carthaginians were breakers of truces, and Hannibal was cruel, but the others were more just. Let us each determine our lives by iron, not by gold, not by selling, but by fighting war. Let us test by our virtue whether Mistress Fortune wishes you or me to reign, or what she may bring. Hear these words too: if the fortune of war spares the virtue of any, take it as certain that I shall spare them their liberty.
Take them as a gift, and I give them with the will of the great gods. That is certainly the view of a king and one worthy of the race of the Aeacidae. If no satisfaction was forthcoming, a threat of war was announced and war was then formally declared by the Roman assembly. The similarity of the two incidents, as well as some awkwardness in the Latin, suggest that 'When Popilius Unless, implausibly, the same fate befell the young Marcus Cato twice, one or another episode must be unhistorical.
The same point about the change in the meaning of hostis is made by C. He distinguishes wars for imperial dominance and glory from wars for the survival of Rome and demands that the former be waged less bitterly. Yet even they are regarded here as fought in the interests of peace, in that they defend the empire against rivals, but cf.
The Cimbri in BC were threatening the northern borders of Italy and were finally defeated by C. Of the wars for empire, those for the conquest of Italy belong to the fifth to the third century BC, with the Samnite wars ending in By then Carthage, though prosperous again, could hardly be regarded as a serious imperial rival: hence C.
Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws
They offered him a large bribe to surrender Roman prisoners of war but he handed them over without payment. See also For first of all, upon his arrival he proposed in the senate that the captives should not be returned; and then when his friends and relatives were trying to keep him, he preferred to go back to his punishment than to break the faith he had given to an enemy.
The censors disfranchised all of them for the rest of their lives, on the grounds that they had broken their oath. They treated similarly one of them who incurred blame by fraudulently evading his solemn oath. For after leaving the camp with Hannibal's permission, he returned a little later saying that he had forgotten something or other.
He then considered that he had released himself from his oath on leaving the camp; but he had done so only in word and not in fact. For on the question of keeping faith, you must always think of what you meant, not of what you said. Another very great example of justice towards an enemy was established by our forefathers when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate that he would kill the king by giving him poison. Fabricius and the senate returned him to Pyrrhus. In this way, they did not give approval to the killing in a criminal way of even a powerful enemy, and one who was waging war unprovoked.
Let us remember also that justice must be maintained even towards the lowliest. The lowliest condition and fortune is that of slaves; the instruction we are given to treat them as if they were employees is good advice: that one should require work from them, and grant to them just treatment. Both of them seem most alien to a human being; but deceit deserves a greater hatred. And out of all injustice, nothing deserves punishment more than that of men who, just at the time when they are most betraying trust, act in such a way that they might appear to be good men.
I have now said enough about justice. Nothing is more suited to human nature than this, but there are many caveats. For first one must see that kindness harms neither the very people whom one seems to be treating kindly, nor others; next, that one's kindness does not exceed one's capabilities; and then, that kindness is bestowed upon each person according to his standing. For those who do someone a favour in such a way that they harm him whom they appear to want to assist, should be judged neither beneficent nor liberal, but dangerous flatterers.
Those who, in order to be liberal towards some, harm others, fall into the same injustice as if they had converted someone else's possessions to their own account. They think that they will appear beneficent towards their friends if they enrich them by any method whatsoever. But that is so far from being a duty that in fact nothing could be more opposed to duty. We should therefore see that the liberality we exercise in assisting our friends does not harm anyone. Consequently, the transference of money by Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its lawful owners to others ought not to be seen as liberal: nothing is liberal if it is not also just.
For those who want to be kinder than their possessions allow first go wrong by being unjust to those nearest The story of the capture of Regulus in BC is elaborated in Most manuscripts omit the whole of 40 which reports two episodes of Roman history that C. The Stoics, Roman lawyers and others held that there were no slaves by nature, only by fortune.
Chrysippus is credited by Seneca On Benefits m. On the other hand, paid employment was generally regarded as unsuitable for free men 1. See p. Usually there lurks within such liberality a greediness to plunder and deprive unjustly, so that resources may be available for lavish gifts. One can see that most men are not so much liberal by nature as drawn by a kind of glory; and in order to be seen to be beneficent they do many things that appear to stem not from goodwill, but from ostentation. Such pretence is closer to sham than to either liberality or honourableness. Here we should look both at the conduct of the man on whom we are conferring a kindness, and at the spirit in which he views us, at the association and fellowship of our lives together, and at the dutiful services that he has previously carried out for our benefit.
If they do not, then the more numerous and more important grounds will carry- more weight. For a brave and great spirit in a man who is not perfect nor wise is generally too impetuous; but those other virtues seem rather to attach themselves to a good man. That is all on the question of conduct. If services have already been rendered, that is if you have not to inspire gratitude, but rather to requite it, then you must take even greater care: for no duty is more necessary than that of requiting gratitude.
Should we not take as our model the fertile fields, which bring forth much more than they have received? We do not hesitate to perform dutiful services for those whom we hope will assist us in the future; what, then, ought we to be like towards those who have already assisted us? There are two aspects of liberality: first, granting a kind service, and secondly, returning it. Whether we grant one or not is up to us. A good man, however, is not permitted to fail to return one provided, of course, that he can do so without injustice. Here we must first of all weigh up the spirit in which each man has acted, his devotion and his goodwill.
For many men do many things out of a certain rashness, failing to use their judgement, or maybe inspired by a frenzied or sudden impulse of the spirit towards everyone, like a gust of wind.
Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws
Such favours should not be considered as important as those that are conferred through judgement, with forethought and constancy. In granting favours, on the other hand, and in requiting gratitude, the most important function of duty if all else is equal is to enrich above all the person who is most in need of riches. But people generally do exactly the opposite; for they defer above all to him from whom they expect the most, even though he does not need them 50 Also, the fellowship between men and their common bonding will best be preserved if the closer someone is to you the more kindness you confer upon him.
Perhaps, though, we should examine more thoroughly what are the natural principles of human fellowship and community. First is something that is seen in the fellowship of the entire human race. For its bonding consists of reason and speech, which reconcile men to one another, through teaching, learning, communicating, debating and making judgements, and unite them in a kind of natural fellowship. It is this that most distances us from the nature of other animals. To them we often impute courage, as with horses or lions, but we C. For they have no share in reason and speech.
Here we must preserve the communal sharing of all the things that nature brings forth for the common use of mankind, in such a way that whatever is assigned by statutes and civil law should remain in such possession as those laws may have laid down,1 but the rest should be regarded as the Greek proverb has it: everything is common among friends.
The things that are common to all men seem to be of the kind that Ennius defines in one case, from which we can extrapolate to many cases: panionship, and those business and commercial transactions that many of them make with many others. A tie narrower still is that of the fellowship between relations: moving from that vast fellowship of the human race we end up with a confined and limited one.
Then, there is the one house in which everything is shared. Indeed that is the principle of a city and the seed-bed, as it were, of a political community. Next there follow bonds between brothers, and then between first cousins and second cousins, who cannot be contained in one house and go out to other houses, as if to colonies. Finally there follow marriages and those connections of marriage from which even more relations arise. In such propagation and increase political communities have their origin. Moreover, the bonding of blood holds men together by goodwill and by love; 55 for it is a great thing to have the same ancestral memorials, to practise the same religious rites, and to share common ancestral tombs.
Of all fellowships, however, none is more important, and none stronger, than when good men of similar conduct are bound by familiarity. For honourableness - the thing that I so often mention — moves us, even if we see it in someone else, and makes us friends of him in whom it seems to reside. Moreover, nothing is more lovable and nothing more tightly binding than similarity in conduct that is good. For when men have similar pursuits and inclinations, it comes about that each one is as much delighted with the other as he is with himself; the result is what Pythagoras wanted in friendship, that several be united into one.
Important also are the common bonds that are created by kindnesses reciprocally given and received, which, provided that they are mutual and gratefully received, bind together those concerned in an unshakeable fellowship. Parents are dear, and children, relatives and acquaintances are dear, but our country has on its own embraced all the affections of all of us. What good man would hesitate to face death on her behalf, if it would do her a service? How much A man who kindly shows the path to someone who is lost lights another's light, so to speak, from his own.
For his own shines no less because he has lit another's. With this one instance, he advises us that if any assistance can be provided without detriment to oneself, it should be given even to a stranger. We should therefore both make use of them and always be contributing something to the common benefit.
Since, though, the resources of individuals are small, but the mass of those who are in need is infinitely great, general liberality must be measured according to the limit laid down by Ennius, that his own light shine no less; then we shall still be capable of being liberal to those close to us. To move from the one that is unlimited, next there is a closer one of the same race, tribe and tongue, through which men are bound strongly to one another.
More intimate still is that of the same city, as citizens have many things that are shared with one another: the forum, temples, porticoes and roads, laws and legal rights, law-courts and political elections; and besides these acquaintances and com1 Cf. The restriction on our obligation to mankind in general, that we do not harm our own interests, is balanced by that on our pursuit of those interests 1.
Next would be our children and our whole household, which looks to us alone and can have no other refuge. Then our relations, who are congenial to us and with whom even our fortunes are generally shared. Therefore whatever is necessary to support life is most owed to those whom I have just mentioned; on the other hand a shared life and a shared living, counsel and conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproofs, flourish most of all in friendships; and friendship is most pleasing when it is cemented by similarity of conduct.
Thus the degrees of ties of relationship will not be the same as those of circumstance. Some duties are owed to one group of people rather than to another. Similarly, advice on observing duty certainly has been handed down, as I myself am now handing it down, but a matter of such importance also demands experience and practice. And now I have said enough on the question of how honourableness, upon which duty hangs, is derived from those things that constitute the justice of human fellowship. But, we must realise, it is that which is done with a great and lofty spirit, one disdaining human affairs, which appears in the most brilliant light.
For that reason, words such as these are so readily available as an insult: One of C. In considering the degree of fellowship with us see 1. He goes on to note that social intercourse is owed primarily to friendship based on similarity of conduct. Even in the context of lawsuits, C.
The very fact that the statues we look upon are usually in military dress bears witness to our devotion to military glory. Both verses are by unknown poets. Orators frequently used these as historical illustrations. The statue of Caesar in a breastplate placed in his forum Pliny, Natural History xxxiv. Gilt equestrian statues of M. It is not merely unvirtuous; it is rather a savagery which repels all civilized feeling.
Therefore the Stoics define courage well when they call it the virtue which fights on behalf of fairness. For that reason no one has won praise who has pursued the glory of courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing can be honourable from which justice is absent. We find in Plato that all the conduct of the Spartans was inflamed by desire for conquest. Consequently, such men allow themselves to be defeated neither by argument nor by any public or legal obligation.
Only too often do they emerge in public life as bribers and agitators, seeking to acquire as much wealth as possible, preferring violent pre-eminence to equality through justice. The greater the difficulty, however, the greater the splendour: there is no occasion from which justice should be absent.
A true and wise greatness of spirit judges that deeds and not glory are the basis of the honourableness that nature most seeks. It prefers not to seem pre-eminent but to be so: he who is carried by the foolishness of the ignorant mob should not be counted a great man. Furthermore, the loftier a man's spirit, the more easily he is driven by desire for glory to injustice. This is slippery ground indeed: scarcely a man can be found who, when he has undertaken toil and confronted dangers, does not yearn for glory as a kind of payment for his achievements.
One lies in disdain for things external, in the conviction that a man should admire, should choose, should pursue nothing except what is honourable and seemly, and should yield to no man, nor to agitation of the spirit, nor to fortune. That is the factor that makes men outstanding in spirit and contemptuous of human things. And in fact this reveals itself in two ways: first, if you judge to be good only that which is honourable, and secondly if your spirit is free from every agitation.
For it must be held that a brave and great spirit will little value things that appear to most men distinguished and even splendid, disdaining them with reason firm and steady; while a man of firm spirit and great constancy will endure circumstances that seem harsh, many and various as they are in the lives and fortunes of mankind, without departing from man's natural state, from the worthy standing of a wise man.
Therefore you must avoid these, and shun also the desire for money. Nothing is more the mark of a mean and petty spirit than to love riches; nothing more Menexenus c. Commentators extend the quotation as far as 'audacity'. The thought of the second sentence is not unPlatonic, but if C. Laches c The allusion to Caesar's autocracy is clear, especially in the charges of demagoguery and rapacity Introduction, p.
The Stoics thought happiness could be achieved by becoming independent of external circumstances through the realization that nothing is really good but virtue which is in our control. De Officiis Book 1 honourable and more magnificent than to despise money if you are without it, but if you have it to devote it to liberality and beneficence. Beware also the desire for glory, as I have said. For it destroys the liberty for which men of great spirit ought to be in competition. Nor should you seek military commands. In fact sometimes these should be refused and sometimes even resigned.
These include the noblest and foremost philosophers,2 and also certain strict and serious men who could not endure the behaviour of the populace or its leaders. Published November 19th by Oxford University Press. On the Commonwealth and on the Laws Paperback. Published December 28th by Cambridge University Press. James E. Zetzel Editor. On the Commonwealth and On the Laws Paperback. Stanley B. George H. Sabine Translator. Marcus Tullius Cicero. Zetzel Translator. Raymond Geuss Editor. Published January 15th by Cornell University Press. David Fott Translation.
Published December 24th by Cornell University Press. Additional Product Features Dewey Edition. Show More Show Less. Compare similar products. You Are Viewing.
Trending Price New. No ratings or reviews yet. Be the first to write a review. Best Selling in Nonfiction See all. Burn after Writing by Sharon Jones , Paperback 2. Save on Nonfiction Trending price is based on prices over last 90 days. Open Borders Inc. You may also like.